^Alt text for screen readers: Most voters want a ceasefire, but hardly anyone in Congress supports one. This chart shows the percent in favor of a ceasefire in Gaza. Among Democratic voters, 80 percent; House Democrats, 8 percent. Republican voters, 56 percent; House Republicans, 0 percent. All voters, 66 percent; all House members, 4 percent. Data comes from House Resolution 786 and an October 20, 2023 poll from Data for Progress. More at stephensemler.substack.com.
I don’t think that’s right.
The way we operated the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had much, much more consideration to the humanitarian toll on civilians, compared to how Israel is currently running their military operation. Even before either invasion, too, the US military knew there was going to be complex and difficult “nation building” afterward.
Take, for example, the way the US and UK troops cleared out Fallujah: leafleting and warning of the assault and specifically letting the civilian population leave before aggressive bombardment. There was controversy about whether military aged males were improperly identified as combatants, but women and children made it out.
The controversy about a cease fire in Gaza is exactly that: letting civilians avoid the places where fighting is happening. The US devoted resources to making that possible, but Israel isn’t protecting those goals to the same degree or manner.
Interesting insight, do you know where I can learn more about this?
Peter Mansoor (a U.S. Army Colonel who was a big part of the strategic shift in Iraq around 2006 to a counterinsurgency doctrine) has written a bunch about the “clear, hold, build” strategy where U.S. troops took territory with a promise they would stay long enough to rebuild it and peacefully hand it over to the local government partners. You can find some of his writing published through the university where he teaches and publishes.
Counterinsurgency (also known as COIN in military circles) was a shift in emphasis, compared to the prior 3 years or so, where the civilian population was seen as partners and a “territory” of sorts to try to win. There was a lot of talk of “hearts and minds” being a key component to winning the war, because foreign occupiers would never have the same level of local knowledge as the actual locals, and having the general population on your side meant that insurgents couldn’t hide in the community.
It didn’t actually work out that way all the time (and frankly, my opinion is that the strategy utterly failed in Afghanistan, even if Iraq eventually stabilized). But that was the doctrine and that was the core strategy pursued by U.S. troops at least from 2006 onward. Civilians mattered, not just in that harming them should be avoided even while pursuing military objectives, but civilian well-being actually counted as a primary military objective in itself.
But even before COIN became the big buzzword in the U.S. military, the strategy did still emphasize the need to take responsibility for the well being of civilians in a war zone. Colin Powell famously warned George W. Bush of what Thomas Friedman would call the “Pottery Barn Rule” where “if you break it, you own it,” in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. And Powell was clear that he was specifically referring to the 26 million residents of Iraq looking to the United States in what would govern Iraq after the “regime change.” It was always understood, even among the most hawkish strategists in the U.S., that invasion carried a responsibility of rebuilding.
I’m not in any way an expert on Gaza, but from my casual observations it sure does seem like the Israeli military doesn’t put anywhere near the same priority of making sure that civilians aren’t unnecessarily harmed in their military operations.
Thank you!
Just wanted to say though that it’s a bit unfair to compare Iraq to this. Iraq wasn’t fueled by raw emotion and rage. It was a lot more calculated since it was (framed as) a preventive measure. How the US acted the first month of Afghanistan is far more apples to apples. And from my research the US did draw immediate criticism for their bombings. And keep in mind that Afganistan is far less densly populated compared to Gaza.
"The war, launched by the United States as “Operation Enduring Freedom” in 2001, began with an initial air campaign that almost immediately prompted concerns over the number of Afghan civilians being killed. "
The number is 2300 dead civilians in 2001, and since the operation began in October thats 2300 in three months. If we extrapolate that to a full year that pace marks the most intense period of civilian deaths by a wide margin. Which matches my assumption that the opening actions, when fueled by intense emotion, leads to a disregard of civilians life. As an aside, those opening months about the same amount of civilians died as the total amount US servicemen in Afghanistan for the whole 20 year war (2300 vs 2400).
I agree, but a key difference is simply the fact that Gazans aren’t allowed to leave, and power/water/food was cut before evacuations. A ground invasion in that context has to be understood with that heightened responsibility towards civilians.
As for the Afghanistan war, I think that rural versus dense urban settlement is also fundamentally different, and difficult to compare. Most of the controversy around civilian deaths in Afghanistan focus on mistargeted aerial bombardment, which I agree matches the initial operations in Gaza. But as the shift turns over to ground forces, Fallujah is probably the comparison I think matches most closely.